• lumpyluggage@lemmy.world
    6·
    3 天前

    There is no way lol… I want Ukraine to win as much as the next guy, but if you know anything about the war then you know that this is not going to happen

    • PugJesus@piefed.socialEnglish
      3·
      3 天前

      Even just starting large-scale SOF raids without intention of retaking Crimea immediately would be a significant game-changer.

    • CanadaPlus
      2·
      3 天前

      I mean, that’s definitely Ukraine’s long term plan if the war continues, but they just managed to fully stop the Russian advance on the mainland.

      So what would a drone-era landing look like? It seems like you’d have the grey zone extending over the water, as well as on the beach and land.

      • supersquirrel@sopuli.xyzOP
        3·
        3 天前

        So what would a drone-era landing look like? It seems like you’d basically have the grey zone extending over the water, as well as on the beach and land.

        Nobody knows exactly but also you can simply conceptualize of the tactical situation like this, think of the amphibious landing and invasion as entirely traditional in nature for the most part, the difference is it would happen after a prolonged campaign of Battlefield Air Interdiction with drones that starved the russian forces in Crimea of supplies to fight and maintain their positions which would include thoroughly erasing their capacity to launch large amount of strike drones in the area of operation. Thus the bulk of russian drones and drone operators are pushed back long before any physical invasion would happen. This isn’t really a departure from traditional military theory, any kind of offensive action virtually requires suppression and elimination of an enemies logistics to set the stage, the advantage has always been far too heavily in favor of the defender in war for this not to be a strategic requirement.

        Of course Ukraine could choose to launch an invasion of Crimea before that point if they were confident enough that their saturation of drone interceptors and AA at every level of organization in their fighting structures are sufficient, but you can also conceptualize that as attempting to accomplish a BAI campaign and an invasion at the same moment and understand it in fairly traditional military terms.

        A failed mirror view of this can be seen in how russia’s Battlefield Air Interdiction campaign through late 2025 into 2026 failed at a strategic level to set the conditions for a successful summer offensive in 2026. If this campaign had been more successful and more oppressive it would have forced Ukraine to begin abandoning territory even when they still had the equipment and means to fight purely because they couldn’t get any supplies whatsoever to the frontline units that needed them. Russia made it very hard for Ukraine to do so, but they have been tactically out adapted by Ukrainian counters to the point that the strategy failed at a general level.

        https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russias-quest-to-intensify-the-theater-wide-battlefield-air-interdiction-campaign-against-ukraines-logistics/