Just wait until you here where the US is keeping it’s attack jets 😱🤯

Aside from its island bases in the South China Sea, Beijing does not have a significant network of military outposts in other countries, and the Laos airbase would be its first facility in another country capable of handling fighter jets.

Ehh…they have a military base in that country off in the Horn of Africa that leases military base space to everyone. We have one shared with the French and one of our own, if I recall. I’d be a little surprised if the Chinese base doesn’t have an airstrip.

Maybe Djibouti?

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Yeah.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_military_bases_in_Djibouti

The United States, China, France, Japan, and Italy all operate military facilities near the capital Djibouti City. These bases are used to conduct operations ranging from anti-piracy, counterterrorism, and intelligence gathering to non-combatant evacuation operations and peacekeeping support.[1]

The Chinese base:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/People’s_Liberation_Army_Support_Base_in_Djibouti

Sounds like it’s mostly a naval base, but:

The heavily fortified base is 0.5 square kilometres (0.2 sq mi) in size and staffed by approximately 1,000–2,000 personnel, and has an underground space of 23,000 square meters.[30][31][32] The base has a 400m runway with an air traffic control tower, as well as a large helicopter apron.[33] The base also houses the PLA Support Base Hospital in Djibouti.[34]

Hmm. That’s pretty short. Is it long enough for Chinese fighters?

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Sounds like not, at least as of 2023.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47249.13?seq=1

There is no evidence to date that Djibouti is being groomed to serve as some kind of air logistics hub for the PLA. At present the Chinese airfield at its Djibouti base is not long enough to support fixed-wing aircraft, including long-range transport aircraft. No fixed-wing aircraft have deployed to the airfield at the facility. Additionally, Djibouti does not possess the necessary attributes for the purpose of aviation logistics support (for example, it lacks the jet fuel and associated fuel farm to refuel jet aircraft). There is also a notable absence of a large number of support and emergency vehicles necessary for extensive jet aircraft operations. Finally, the Djibouti facility lacks the PLAAF personnel to conduct these kinds of operations.

The Djibouti facility also lacks PLAAF long-range transport aircraft. At present, the PLAAF has roughly 20 Y-20 aircraft with a range of 3,700 kilometers (payload of 66,000 kilograms) or 2,299 miles and a maximum range of 5,200 kilometers (51,000 kilograms payload or 3,321 miles. In contrast to the PLAN, with a growing sophisticated fleet of expeditionary ships and support vessels (some of which have conducted port calls into the Djibouti facility), the PLAAF does not appear at present to be in a position to initiate robust out-of-area air operations. It is possible the PLA will eventually develop far-seas aviation facilities in support of overseas PLAAF operations. But, if the logisticians from the NDU report are correct, the PLA is not likely to attempt to place both aviation and maritime logistics activities at the same location. They are more likely to place aviation logistics functions at a separate overseas facility when China succeeds in obtaining host-nation permission for such an activity.