cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/57137896

Archived

On Friday July 31, 2026, China passed a new regulation concerning exit (and entry) bans.

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Importantly, the regulation also “refines restrictive measures”, in other words: exit bans.

The new regulation follows an already massive uptick in the use of exit bans since 2023, when Safeguard Defenders’ major report Trapped drew attention to the growing use of exit bans.

While the announced objective of greater clarity in the implementation of the key Exit and Entry Administration Law would have been welcome given the widespread (ab-)use of exit bans outside established law, the new regulation leaves much to be desired and further codifies some of the worst aspects of the PRC’s use of exit bans.

Of particular concern are articles 4 and 5, which open the door even further on the PRC’s transnational repression efforts and increase the risks for foreign nationals (see analysis on what’s new below).

Background

Exit bans are state-imposed bans to bar an individual from leaving the country, either at the border or by cancelling or confiscating their passport. Their use under a variety of judicial and administrative provisions has been growing exponentially under Xi Jinping and are applied to both Chinese and foreign nationals.

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Raising concerns among foreign firms in China, the new rules explicitly link business behavior with national security issues, with penalties including fines, asset freezes, criminal liability and exit bans for foreigners suspected of violating the latest rules.

The new rules give China more excuses to enforce exit bans on foreigners.

While the PRC does not release transparent comprehensive data on its effective use of exit bans, Safeguard Defenders’ research on the available sample in the Supreme Court database (CJO) shows consistent and staggering growth in the use of the measure over the past couple of years.

[Exit ban mentions on court verdict have sharply increased in China, from less than 3,000 in 2017 to more than 150,000 and 137,000 in 2024 and 2025, respectively.]

What’s new?

Primary concerns of the new regulation are related to articles 4 and 5, while additional concerns regard articles 2 and 6. The full original text of the regulation is available here. An English translation, hosted by Geopolitechs, can be found here.

• Article 2 – Travel Risks

Article 2 gives border agents and immigration institutions the responsibility to provide travel warnings and “dissuade” citizens from traveling to highest-risk areas. While travel risk advisories are common – and indeed important – across most if not all countries, the PRC’s regular use of blocking tourism to countries as a form of political retaliation in its foreign policy does add some reason for concern.

• Article 4 – Transnational Repression

Of acute concern is article 4. It states that exit bans can be imposed “[w]here a Chinese citizen engages in illegal or criminal activities abroad and thereby endangers national security and interests”.

Given the CCP’s extremely broad and continuously expanding understanding of “national security and interests”, this measure undoubtedly serves to cement the common practice of persecuting individuals for the legitimate and legal exercise of constitutional rights and freedoms abroad.

Public information is often lacking on the number of individuals who face criminal or state security investigations, questioning, prosecution and/or exit bans because of opinions expressed, activities partaken in or even simple associations while abroad, but appear to be growing consistently.

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While existing rules already allow for near limitless use of exit bans, the codification of a long-arm jurisdictional aspect such as this is very worrying.

Article 4 also outlines the use of exit bans for a new type of offense not previously codified - yet related to the recent April regulation on State Council Provisions on Industrial and Supply Chain Security as well as Beijing’s increased willingness to flex its muscle through the use of export controls: exit bans can be imposed “[w]here a Chinese citizen violates provisions on export control, technology import and export administration or other provisions, and may endanger national industrial security or technological security”.

• Article 5 – Heightened Risk for Foreign Nationals

Article 5 primarily deals with the entry of foreign citizens. However, one area to watch is the statement that “[w]here a foreign national is included on a countermeasure list, unreliable entity list, malicious entity list, or is subject to countermeasures [i.e, sanctioned by the PRC], restrictive measures or other measures, and it is necessary to take relevant measures in accordance with law, including refusing to issue exit or entry documents or denying entry”.

The open-ended nature and the PRC’s prior politicized use of measures mentioned in the article risk further expanding the use of exit bans as a means of both hostage diplomacy and economic coercion – including against the foreign employees of private entities that operate in the PRC -, warranting an urgent update to current travel and business advisories for China.

• Article 6 – Continued Uncertainty

While the regulation was announced as a way to establish better protection for individuals, it fails to do so. Article 6 provides for the notification of those under an exit ban, but… such a notification can be waived “where circumstances exist in which such notification may affect national security, criminal case investigations or other matters”. The already overly broad interpretation of “national security” matters in China and the catch-all “other matters” all but ensures continued abuse of the exception.

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