cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/53528320

cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/53527592

Archived

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In terms of media presence, one of the main instruments is China Radio International, which broadcasts news in Albanian. A lot of its content focuses on day-to-day developments in Albania, often drawing on sources like the Albanian Telegraphic Agency [Agjencia Telegrafike Shqiptare, known as ATA], the public broadcaster, or other local outlets.

Alongside that, it produces a significant amount of content about developments in China, as well as Chinese perspectives on global affairs. There is also the Xinhua News Agency, although it publishes in English and only occasionally in Albanian. In addition, there are a few local online media portals whose editorial line tends to align with Chinese narratives. It’s usually quite subtle; their day-to-day coverage focuses on Albania, but when it comes to international issues, the framing often reflects a more pro-Chinese stance.

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A few years ago, a formal cooperation agreement was established with Albania’s public broadcaster to air documentaries on Chinese-Albanian relations, covering historical, economic and cultural ties. This drew some criticism at the time, as it was seen by some as using the public broadcaster as a platform for Chinese propaganda. As far as I’m aware, that agreement is still in place, with these documentaries continuing to be aired periodically.

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Another important dimension is academic and cultural diplomacy. The Confucius Institute at the University of Tirana is a well-known example. It primarily functions as an educational and cultural centre, but it is also a soft power instrument. Beyond the Institute itself, there have been more recent efforts at the institutional level. For instance, the University of Tirana organised an official study visit to China aimed at strengthening academic cooperation. Private universities are also building cooperations in this regard.

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[Albania] is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative, so the relationship is mostly based on trade – and it is quite imbalanced. That said, there have been some recent implicit political signals. Recent statements and public gestures by Prime Minister Edi Rama suggest a more visible openness toward engagement with China. This may also function as a subtle reminder to Western partners that Albania has other diplomatic and economic options, even while its formal strategic orientation remains EU accession and transatlantic cooperation. For example, quite recently, the Prime Minister invited a representative of the Chinese embassy, along with three Chinese students, onto his personal podcast to promote the Albanian translation of The New China Playbook. It received significant media attention, particularly because it was the Prime Minister himself promoting it.

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Over time, this kind of exposure can contribute to a gradual normalisation of the Chinese political model as a legitimate alternative. And this is happening in a broader context where many citizens feel increasingly dissatisfied with the post-transition process. Expectations around democratic consolidation have not been fully met – or at least not as quickly as people had hoped. So for some, there is a sense that the transition has not delivered, whether economically, politically, or socially.

That tends to generate frustration and distrust toward public institutions, elections, and even the media itself. In that kind of environment, long-term exposure to these more subtle narratives about an alternative model can slowly start to shift perceptions. It is not direct or confrontational; it works gradually, by presenting the Chinese system as effective, stable, and successful. Over time, that can feed into the idea that a party-state model is a viable option.

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There is also an impact on how democratic standards and values are understood. The EU accession process, for example, is not just about adopting laws but about embedding core values like human rights, rule of law, freedom of expression, and accountability. These are not framed in the same way within the Chinese model. And then, there is the technological dimension. We are increasingly seeing different models of digital governance, including when it comes to artificial intelligence. The EU tends to emphasise ethics, rights, and safeguards, while the Chinese model operates quite differently. Over time, exposure to these alternative narratives can subtly reshape how these values are perceived or prioritised.

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