cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/51027997

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  • The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has created a global network of individuals and organizations as part of its united front system. In four democratic states—the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Germany—this network includes more than 2,000 organizations. These constitute latent capacity that the Party can mobilize to advance the Party’s agenda.
  • Beijing’s network is the product of protracted co-optation of existing civil society organizations overseas and the global expansion of domestic united front elements. The Party has spent decades assiduously cultivating overseas Chinese community organizations, co-opting local leaders and institutions to embed its preferences within civil society. Even groups that previously spent decades supporting the Republic of China (Taiwan) now fly the flag of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
  • The Party leverages this global network to support its primary goal of national rejuvenation. According to the Party’s definition, rejuvenation entails unification with Taiwan and making the PRC the global leader in terms of national power. United front work supports this goal by contributing to the PRC’s diplomatic, economic, scientific, and even military development, as well as the Party’s ability to respond to crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic.
  • This includes engaging in malign and illegal activities in foreign countries. Overseas groups with ties to the united front have directly supported illicit technology transfer, espionage, talent recruitment, and voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf. These groups also engage in transnational repression, monitoring, harassing, and/or intimidating dissidents, ethnic minorities, and other critics of the Party.
  • In democratic countries, these groups influence political decision-making by conditioning stakeholders to consider Beijing’s interests and sensitivities. United front organizations have been instrumental in shaping the approaches of local governments and political actors, particularly where oversight is weak. They have influenced legislation and public statements, and managed official engagements with the PRC.
  • Where the CCP encounters opposition, the united front functions as a political weapon to isolate, neutralize, or counter Beijing’s critics. The united front system leverages its network of organizations to remove impediments to the achievement of core CCP ambitions through influence, subversion, co-optation, and coercion. These goals include building support for and neutralizing resistance to the annexation of Taiwan.
  • Constraining the CCP’s ability to interfere in democracies requires active transparency. Much of the CCP’s united front activity is at least partially visible in democratic societies. Better education and information sharing could help officials and the general public recognize risks and avoid entanglement. United front groups are rarely listed in existing foreign agent registration systems, limiting the ability of governments to monitor or investigate them.

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Overseas united front work goes beyond attempts to harness the wealth and knowledge of Chinese diaspora communities to support national development goals. It also seeks to further the Party’s interests, which are increasingly global. The country is currently the world’s top trader, accounting for over 14 percent of global exports in 2023. It leads international institutions and forums with partners across the globe. And even its military is beginning to venture ever further afield and expand its international footprint.

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The united front system operates on a global level. But when democratic countries recognize united front work as a problem, they rarely view it as a global issue. As a result, efforts to build information-sharing platforms or to work with allies and partners to combat CCP activities within democratic societies are minimal—if they exist at all. This includes cooperation at both the governmental and non-governmental levels. Civil society organizations frequently work to spread awareness internationally on salient issues, something that would be useful for building a better understanding of how the united front operates beyond the countries covered in this report. The attention paid to united front work in conferences and fora that focus on challenges posed by the CCP is disproportionately small given united front work’s negative impact on democratic societies. Raising the visibility of issues related to united front work helps build transparency and navigate the complex landscape of security challenges together while preserving democratic values.