cross-posted from: https://lemmy.sdf.org/post/49876990

Archived

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Between June 1, 2022, and January 21, 2026, the Chinese Embassy in Manila published nearly 400 South China Sea/West Philippine Sea-related social media posts on Facebook. A close reading of this body of messaging from the embassy’s official Facebook page reveals that China is waging a sustained narrative campaign – what China calls “public opinion warfare” – designed to delegitimize Philippine actions, erode international legal norms, and normalize Chinese control without firing a shot.

This is not crude propaganda. It is disciplined, legalistic messaging that relies on repetition, timing, and strategic attribution of blame, taking advantage of one of the Philippines’ most cherished democratic values – freedom of expression. Three empirical patterns stand out: the increasing personalization of blame after 2023; the persistent repetition of delegitimizing legal terms; and the careful modulation of rhetoric around events.

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One of the most notable changes in the 2024–2026 period is the increasing personalization of blame. Earlier embassy messaging overwhelmingly targeted abstract entities: “the Philippines,” “the Philippine side,” or government institutions such as the Department of Foreign Affairs or the Armed Forces.

After 2023, that pattern changed. Posts increasingly named individuals – particularly Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, Commodore Jay Tarriela – often accusing him of lying, smearing, or misleading the public.

This new development is unmistakable within the first three weeks of 2026, when the Chinese Embassy published at least 15 separate Facebook posts and statements that named or directly addressed Tarriela. No other Philippine official has been singled out with comparable frequency at any earlier point in the June 2022-January 2026 dataset.

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This transition from institutional blame to individual blame is not incidental. It reflects a classic information-operations tactic: personifying responsibility to reshape the narrative terrain. By attaching alleged wrongdoing to a single, named spokesperson, or to elected officials who could be running for higher office in the future, the embassy transforms a state-level dispute over facts, law, and conduct into a personalized contest over credibility and character. The intent is to obscure facts and the law, redirecting public attention away from the substance of maritime incidents and toward the supposed political motives and integrity of individuals.

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This personalization serves a clear narrative function: isolating transparency itself. In the case of Tarriela, by repeatedly attacking the most visible messenger of the Philippines’ transparency policy, China’s embassy sends a broader signal to other officials. The message is not simply that specific statements are disputed, but that championing transparency carries personal and reputational costs. It discourages officials from speaking publicly, and also warns others to steer clear of criticizing and exposing China’s maritime aggressions. Further, it reframes factual disclosure of Beijing’s coercion as malicious intent.

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Despite covering nearly four years and 400 Facebook posts, the Chinese Embassy relies on a remarkably narrow vocabulary of delegitimization.

Such repetition is effective not because it convinces skeptics, but because it blurs lines for many Filipinos who may not be paying attention to the disputes or have not been exposed to authoritative, easily digestible information related to the South China Sea. Over time, repeated illegal claims start to feel normal – and what feels normal is often mistaken as legitimate.

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For smaller states, this narrative is especially constraining. It pressures them to prove their innocence rather than assert their rights, and it reframes international sympathy as indulgence rather than obligation.

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No propaganda narrative is complete without an external villain. In the Chinese Embassy’s posts, that role is often assigned to the United States. In at least 27 Facebook posts since June 2022, the embassy attributed Philippine actions to manipulation by the United States or “external forces.” This framing denies Philippine agency while simultaneously portraying Manila as dangerously irresponsible. It also allows China to present itself as a defender of regional autonomy – even as it steadily erodes it.

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What Can Be Done

Falsehoods and efforts to confuse the public must be exposed continuously and rapidly. At present, the Department of Foreign Affairs [DFA] in Manila often issues one-off rebuttals in the form of very short statements, usually only after pressure from elected political leaders. This reactive approach cedes the initiative.

Instead, the DFA should work closely with the Philippine Coast Guard, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the Department of National Defense to establish a standing, inter-agency rapid response mechanism. Such a team should be empowered to debunk – within minutes rather than days – false or misleading claims issued by the Chinese Embassy in Manila, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, and their “wolf warrior” diplomats. Speed matters: in the information domain, narratives that go unchallenged quickly harden into perceived facts.

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The DFA should move beyond rebuttal and proactively institutionalize its own transparency initiatives – not view transparency as too offensive to China. Rather than merely responding to Chinese narratives, the DFA should work with the West Philippine Sea Transparency Group under the PCG, and assist in regularly publishing time-stamped evidence, clear timelines of incidents, and authoritative legal explanations grounded in UNCLOS and the 2016 Arbitral Award.

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Transparency should not be treated as an ad hoc political tool, but as a standing policy instrument – one that makes Philippine actions predictably principled, verifiable, and difficult to misrepresent.

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If China’s social media efforts to disinform and confuse are not effectively countered, Filipino public perception may gradually tilt in favor of Chinese positions, influencing policy choices in ways that subordinate Philippine interests – and steadily erode the primacy of international law in maritime Southeast Asia.