Other than (metaphysical) anti-realism, which I’m under the impression is an umbrella for all types of denial that there is an independent, external reality.
I suppose you could even envision someone taking the stance that there is an external reality, because they have found empirical proof, which would make them a realist as well as a proponent of whatever this is.
They are somewhat synonymous to me as well, but I used scientific realism to distinguish other epistemological vectors to realism/anti-realism. I switched to science there since you mentioned the use of empirical proofs to acquire knowledge.
As a tangent, other forms of knowledge acquisition exist; one can acquire mathematical knowledge, which isn’t subjected to the same empirical burden when compared to, for example, facts in biology or physics. Some then go on to espouse the realism of mathematical entities (structural realism, among others), but these would be obtained a priori, so you’re looking for the camp who opposes this. I think they’re typically just different strains of empiricism.
You are right that there is a 2x2 grid you can make to relate the two. On one hand, you have anti-realism versus realism, and on the other rationalism versus empiricism.
There is definitely an epistemology of metaphysics. I think that covers a large part of analytical philosophy which spans all the way back to Descartes.
Hey, I think I found the term I’m looking for. Metaphysical deflationist probably works and is specific enough to communicate exactly what I have in mind. Thanks for the help!
Hmm. That’s more my background. Being a tautology (as all math basically is) isn’t the same as empirical justification, you’re right, even if it’s also very convincing. Most mathematicians take some sort of Platonist standpoint on the origins of math - most would argue even the mind screw infinite structures we encounter in higher mathematics are real in some sense. Personally, I guess I’d say mathematical intuition is an impression of the world we’ve interacted with through evolution and so is still empirical in some sense. When you start doing really weird things with it I’m less sure.
One thing I was thinking about here is Bell’s inequality and how it pretty much disproves the strongest forms of realism if you understand it. I don’t know what the final laws of physics will be like, but when (or if? that last sliver of nature has sure been elusive) they come I’m probably going to adopt their simplest axiomisation as my working definition of reality. Until then, I feel like I shouldn’t pick anything with certainty, lest it turns out there’s even weirder underlying logic with non-subadditive probability amplitudes or something.