http://archive.today/2026.11.15-112701/https://www.nytimes.com/2026/11/15/world/europe/ron-arad-missing-israel-iran-asgari-hunt.html

On Oct. 16, 1986, an Israeli F4-Phantom jet streaked through the sky over southern Lebanon. Mr. Arad, then a 28-year-old weapons officer, took aim at a Palestine Liberation Organization target and fired.

The bomb detonated prematurely, badly damaging the aircraft. Mr. Arad ejected.

Everyone agrees, after years of investigations, that Mr. Arad was captured by a Lebanese Shiite militia and political group known as Amal. The group’s chief of security, Mustafa Dirani, took charge of the fallen airman.

The militants offered to trade their hostage for millions of dollars and the release of Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners. But Israel’s defense minister at the time, Yitzhak Rabin, had suffered politically for a prisoner swap in 1985 and was reluctant to make a deal.


The most explosive evidence against Iran burst into public view in 1994, and it shaped public opinion and news accounts for decades.

Israeli commandos stormed into Lebanon and kidnapped Mr. Dirani, the militia member who was last known to have held Mr. Arad. They whisked him to an underground prison in an operation known as Poisonous Sting.

Under questioning, Mr. Dirani said he had stashed Mr. Arad in a home in the Lebanese village of Nabi Chit, where a trusted family could watch him. One night, he said, the men assigned to guard Mr. Arad had left the house, probably in response to an unrelated Israeli raid nearby. When they returned, he said, Mr. Arad was gone.

Years had passed, and Mr. Dirani said he did not know where the airman was.

Mr. Dirani’s interrogator did not believe that. “You couldn’t reason with Dirani. The only thing that worked was force,” the interrogator, Doron Zehavi, later recalled in an interview.

Mr. Dirani would later testify that he was physically and sexually tortured — claims that the Israeli government broadly denied. But it acknowledged rough treatment and that Mr. Dirani may have been threatened with sexual assault.

Under harsh interrogation, Mr. Dirani recounted a meeting with an Iranian official who told him that the Revolutionary Guards had snatched Mr. Arad and taken him to an Iranian prison camp.

“After his soul was drained out, when he spat blood, then he tells us about a massive Revolutionary Guards camp complex in Iran,” Mr. Zehavi said.

“The Iranian authorities have been holding Ron Arad for more than six years,” Mr. Rabin said in 1995, “and they are directly and fully responsible for his fate.”


Iran knew that Israel would pay a hefty price for information about Mr. Arad. If Iranian leaders possessed such information, why would they not try to capitalize on it?

Finally, in 2004, it seemed like that might happen.

Israel agreed to free a high-profile Lebanese inmate in exchange for genetic evidence proving what happened to Mr. Arad. Hezbollah’s leader at the time, Hassan Nasrallah, was eager to make that happen, so he enlisted help from the Iranian government.

Iran dispatched Abdullah Saberi, a Revolutionary Guards commander who’d served many years in Lebanon, to help coordinate the search, according to former Israeli and Iranian officials.

The Hezbollah-Iranian investigation concluded with a secret report saying that Mr. Arad had died in 1988 in Nabi Chit, the village in eastern Lebanon where he had been held, according to three former Iranian officials. The document, the details of which have not been previously reported, concluded that he was most likely buried somewhere there.

Why, intelligence officers asked, would Iran have dispatched a Revolutionary Guards commander to lead the search if it had not been involved with the disappearance? To the Israelis, this was evidence of high-level Iranian complicity.

“The fact that a highly important Iranian general flew to Lebanon from Tehran to bring a unique body of knowledge and help Hezbollah locate the grave only added to our deep conviction that Iran was behind this event,” Mr. Zimmt, the former intelligence officer who participated in the review, told The Times.


In 2006, Yuval Diskin, the head of Israel’s domestic security agency, Shin Bet, launched a comprehensive review of the Arad case. After two decades without a breakthrough, investigators re-examined every aspect.

“We went through everything, item by item, and examined all the sources, their reliability and the way the information had been obtained,” Mr. Diskin told The Times in an interview. “We reached the conclusion that all the reports or analyses based on those reports, according to which Ron Arad had been transferred to or had reached Iran at some stage, were incorrect and were based on serious mistakes in reading the intelligence that had been collected, or on unreliable or erroneous information.”

The Shin Bet team concluded that Mr. Arad never fell into the hands of Hezbollah or the Revolutionary Guards. The answer to his disappearance, the team said, most likely rested in the village of Nabi Chit — the very place that the Hezbollah-Iranian investigation had pointed to.

Rather than dropping the Iran theory, the Mossad doubled down with an audacious, and previously unreported, kidnapping operation.


A general in the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guards named Alireza Asgari had been on the Mossad’s radar for years. The general had close ties with Hezbollah leaders and had risen to be deputy Iranian defense minister. Most important, he had arrived in Lebanon shortly after Mr. Arad vanished.

In December 2006, General Asgari flew to Istanbul and checked into the Ceylan Hotel, according to his wife, Ziba Ahmadi. From there, he vanished.

General Asgari’s disappearance quickly became one of the intelligence world’s biggest whodunits.

The Israelis have steadfastly denied involvement.

Years later, as the United States and Iran negotiated a nuclear deal and prisoner swaps, the Iranians asked their American counterparts what had happened to their missing general. American officials denied involvement, but quietly began asking questions themselves.

Israeli officials told U.S. negotiators that General Asgari was dead, according to a former American official involved in the negotiations. Three other former American officials who worked closely with Israel said that Mossad operatives kidnapped him, interrogated him for weeks and killed him.

One of the former officials said that General Asgari had been questioned aboard a boat and dumped into the Black Sea. They said that the Mossad had questioned the general over potential involvement in Mr. Arad’s disappearance. Interrogators had found no such ties.

General Asgari’s interrogation had failed to turn up evidence of Mr. Arad’s whereabouts. So once again, officials started from scratch.

Mr. Kalo, who led the Israeli military’s missing-in-action unit in 2014, recounted in an interview with The Times how he had examined years of intercepted communications, informant reports and analytical assessments.

He reached the same conclusion that the Shin Bet team and the Hezbollah-Iranian investigation had reached years earlier. Mr. Arad had most likely died in 1988, probably in Nabi Chit. He was never in Iran.

Mr. Kalo said he made clear to Israeli intelligence officers that abducting Iranians would not solve the Arad case.

Mr. Kalo said he delivered his lengthy report to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel in late 2016. The conclusion quickly appeared on Israel’s Channel 2 news.

But two years later, nearly two decades after he helped coordinate the Hezbollah search for Mr. Arad in Lebanon, General Saberi stepped out of his apartment and ended up inside a refrigerator box and a Mossad moving van.


Gen. Abdullah Saberi, an Iranian commander, stepped out for a jog early one morning in an upscale diplomatic quarter of Syria’s capital. Israeli intelligence officers waited nearby. Posing as movers, they had slipped past the neighborhood’s security checkpoints.

As he headed for a nearby park, General Saberi passed two men who carried an oversize refrigerator box. In a flash, the men restrained the general, drugged him, threw the box over his head, shoved him into a white van and left as if nothing had happened.

He was whisked to Israel for interrogation, according to numerous officials in the Middle East, including senior Iranian officials close to General Saberi and a Syrian official who reviewed video of the September 2021 kidnapping.

As a veteran of Iran’s powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, General Saberi knew many secrets. But his interrogators were interested in only one.

What did he know about Ron Arad?

Mr. Arad was the only thing that interrogators asked him about, Iranian officials said.

After a lengthy interrogation, the dazed general was dumped on a street in Johannesburg, South Africa. He later said he was tortured.

As questions swirled in Israel, David Barnea, the Mossad chief at the time, said he had authorized an operation to find information on Mr. Arad. He described the mission as “courageous and daring,” but ultimately a “failure.”

After that, Mr. Barnea told Mossad members that they might as well throw everything they knew about the Arad case into the shredder, associates recall.

None of the operations, the abductions, the raids or the killings had gotten them closer to finding this missing airman. The Mossad began looking seriously at Nabi Chit.

This was the village, Mr. Dirani had told interrogators long ago, where he had stashed Mr. Arad in the care of a trusted family. Those friends had left Mr. Arad alone one night, he had said, to fight Israeli troops nearby. It is also the village that the Hezbollah-Iranian investigation had identified as Mr. Arad’s probable resting place. At least two subsequent Israeli inquiries had reached the same conclusion.


One of the few men suspected of knowing Mr. Arad’s location back in 1988, former Israeli and current Lebanese officials said, was Ahmad Shukr, a retired Lebanese security officer. Last December, Mr. Shukr left home for a meeting about what he thought was a business deal.

He promptly disappeared, and Lebanese officials believe that he was abducted by Israeli agents. Mr. Shukr’s whereabouts remains a mystery, as does what he may have told investigators.

Israeli officials now say that the closest thing the government has to a theory is that Mr. Arad was executed as retribution for the killing of Mr. Shukr’s brother, who died battling Israeli forces that night in 1988.

A few months after Mr. Shukr’s disappearance, Israeli soldiers descended on Nabi Chit in one of the deadliest clashes of this latest round of fighting with Hezbollah. Dozens of Lebanese were killed and wounded.

Israeli soldiers searched a corner of a cemetery, looking for the remains of Mr. Arad, and unearthed a grave. They found nothing, but officials say that the search continues — with a focus now on Lebanon rather than Iran.


Officials who were once certain that Iran was responsible told The Times that they had most likely been wrong all along, including Raz Zimmt, a former Israeli military intelligence analyst who helped write a key 2005 report that pointed blame at Tehran. That assessment, he said in a recent interview, was probably mistaken because of “a natural inclination to pin everything on the regime in Tehran.”

In interviews, nobody suggested that Israeli intelligence officials had intentionally misled the government over the decades about Iran’s role. Rather, they said that the conclusions were based on fragmented or circumstantial evidence and were probably influenced by confirmation bias — the tendency to give more weight to conclusions that fit with previously held beliefs.

Such biases have clouded Israel’s vision before. Before the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas-led attacks on Israel, officials were preoccupied by Iran and Hezbollah and underestimated the closer threat posed by Hamas, even as it raised millions and prepared for an assault. Israeli officials were so convinced that Hamas could not muster a coordinated attack that they doubted it despite obtaining the battle plans.

Israeli officials were again overconfident in their intelligence before the current war with Iran, when they incorrectly predicted a popular uprising that could topple the government in Tehran.