By Steven Erlanger
The Islamic Republic, already weakened and unpopular, is now further diminished, its power at home and in the region at one of its lowest ebbs since its leaders took power during the revolution that overthrew Iran’s American-backed shah in 1978-79.
Iran’s decline began two years ago, with Israel’s tough and sustained response to an invasion by Hamas from Gaza. It accelerated when Israel eroded Iran’s air defenses, defeated Hezbollah and profited from the Syrian revolution that overthrew Bashar al-Assad, another ally of Tehran.
But now, with the ayatollah’s death and intense destruction from the air, Iran’s regional sway has ebbed further, with uncertain consequences that will play out over months and even years.
Presuming there is no revolution, a reconstituted Iranian government must still grapple with a powerful Israel and a United States it cannot trust. The current regime has made nuclear enrichment a key element in its efforts to cement regional power and deterrence. And it has refused to change course, even as that display of persistence seems to have brought it closer to destruction than any other policy, whether that be supporting terrorism abroad or massive repression at home.
It is unclear if even a more moderate government would make new concessions over its nuclear program under the pressure of war. It is also unclear if any Iranian leader would feel able to trust President Trump, who tore up President Obama’s nuclear deal in 2018, and now has bombed Iran twice in the middle of ongoing negotiations. Would Tehran deem it necessary to give in on the nuclear issue to survive? Or if a hard-line, more security-dominated government emerges, will it try to race toward a nuclear weapon, more convinced than ever of its need?
In the coming days, however, Iran may spread more short-term chaos as its current leadership tries to bring an end to the war while saving the regime.
But in the longer term, an Iran that is wrapped up in its own domestic problems — trying to avoid elite fragmentation and consolidate a new leadership or even move toward a more consultative one, with less clerical influence and more power sharing — will not have the energy or the resources to meddle in the region. That could open up new opportunities for Lebanon and the Palestinians, as it has already done for the Syrians.
It leaves Israel ascendant, making it even more of an ineradicable fact in the region that the Sunni nations must accommodate. A new and more moderate government could take office in Israel after elections later this year. With Iran defanged, it may feel it has the mandate to build on the cease-fire in Gaza and negotiate seriously with the Palestinians, under pressure from Washington and the Saudis.
Steven Erlanger, who covered the Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, writes about European and Middle Eastern security and diplomacy.
I am the chief diplomatic correspondent for The New York Times, covering Europe. I’m based in Berlin.
I studied political philosophy and government at Harvard, taught in the Kennedy School of Government, and having grown up with the Vietnam War, went to Woodstock and fell happily into journalism, first at The Boston Globe, then, in 1987, at The Times. Among other awards, I have shared in two Pulitzer Prizes, one for Al Qaeda in 2002 and one for Russia in 2017.
I aspire to be fair and empathic, to listen more than speak, to have my own opinion on what I cover to be something of a mystery, to be clear, analytical and thoughtful, even, at times, original.